This New General in Afghanistan-- Mixed Reviews

[Wifey]

if you all want to continue on with a LOSING propostion the please see that things are going very very poorly in Afghanistan now & unless WE commit many many more people to the cause(DRAFT) and much much more money and  are willing to STAY for the Loooooong haul(5-10yrs) then continue on with the absurdity of following the same path as Bush took & be prepared for the GREATEST DEPRESSION the world has ever known

http://www.truthout.org/092809W?n

like it or not the losing propositon has been elected for 4 years and it is depressing but I'm sure he's not the greatest depression. I think that goes to Pelosi , Reid and Obama jointly when people think that we have to put up with the three stooges.

We could be winning in Afghanistan if Obama had the will.

[whatfreedom]

ok here is what McCrystal said as an excerpt and he holds no punches that the situation is B-L-E-A-K

"McChrystal describes all that would be necessary for this new-and-improved strategy to work, such as beefing up Afghan security forces, dealing with the ineptitude and corruption of the Afghan government, and redefining "the nature of the fight." To some much of this will seem like a bridge too far. But what jumps off these declassified pages is line after line indicating that the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan have truly botched the mission so far. In other words, thank you, George W. Bush and Dick Cheney.

McChrystal notes that US and NATO forces—known as ISAF, for International Security Assistance Forces—have really screwed the pooch to date:

ISAF is a conventional force that is poorly configured for [counterinsurgency], inexperienced in local languages and culture, and struggling with challenges inherent to coalition warfare. These intrinsic disadvantages are exacerbated by our current operational culture and how we operate.

Pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us—physically and psychologically—from the people we seek to protect. In addition, we run the risk of strategic defeat by pursuing tactical wins that cause civilian casualties or unnecessary collateral damage. The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves.


So the United States has spent $440 billion on the war in Afghanistan only to field a force not up to the task and that has failed. And he lists areas where these failures have occurred: "how we traverse the country, how we use force, and how we partner with the Afghans." The commander doesn't hold back: "our conventional warfare culture is part of the problem."

McChrystal fully unloads on this point:

ISAF has not sufficiently studied Afghanistan's peoples whose needs, identities and grievances vary from province to province and from valley to valley. This complex environment is challenging to understand, particularly for foreigners. For this [counterinsurgency] strategy to succeed, ISAF leaders must redouble efforts to understand the social and political dynamics of areas all regions of the country and take action that meets the needs of the people, and insist that [Afghan] officials do the same.


That is some admission. US forces have been engaged in Afghanistan for longer than the length of US involvement in World War I and II, and they are still essentially clueless. And the insurgents, he adds, "out perform" Kabul and the ISAF at information operations.

The problem is big and deep, according to McChrystal. US and NATO forces, in adopting a counterinsurgency tactic of protecting and bonding with the Afghan public, will have to forge new connections with the Afghan people while standing up an Afghan security force and interacting with a corrupt Afghan government that alienates the public. And there's no time for a gradual ramp-up on these fronts: "Success will require a discrete 'jump' to gain the initiative, demonstrate progress in the short term, and secure long-term support." "

and seeing how neighboring USSR and many over the history of planet Earth have been UNABLE to took control of this area WHY pray tell does America think it can do the job after already trying to since supplying Freedom Fighters in the Reagan years?

the full link:

http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/09/lost-afghanistan

[redcap]

whatfreedom, why don't you just go over there and straighten this mess out?

[whatfreedom]

whatfreedom, why don't you just go over there and straighten this mess out?

if it were so easy even GeeW could have solved the issue in 7 1/2 years huh with a more willing coalition than he had in Iraq

here's a story on the abject poverty of the nation and how we are training malnourished skinny runts to become Giant GI Joes likely so we have another source to sell weapons to and to help protect our Hydrocarbon interests

http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/09/meet-afghan-army

and here's more on our NATO allies thoughts - summed best as "Get Out while we still can"

http://www.tomdispatch.com/

[whatfreedom]

oh and about those 90,000 Afghan soldiers(including police) here's an excerpt

"The Invisible Men

What is there to show for all this remarkably expensive training? Although in Washington they may talk about the 90,000 soldiers in the Afghan National Army, no one has reported actually seeing such an army anywhere in Afghanistan. When 4,000 U.S. Marines were sent into Helmand Province in July to take on the Taliban in what is considered one of its strongholds, accompanying them were only about 600 Afghan security forces, some of whom were police. Why, you might ask, didn't the ANA, 90,000 strong after eight years of training and mentoring, handle Helmand on its own? No explanation has been offered. American and NATO officers often complain that Afghan army units are simply not ready to "operate independently," but no one ever speaks to the simple question: Where are they?

My educated guess is that such an army simply does not exist. It may well be true that Afghan men have gone through some version of "Basic Warrior Training" 90,000 times or more. When I was teaching in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2006, I knew men who repeatedly went through ANA training to get the promised Kalashnikov and the pay. Then they went home for a while and often returned some weeks later to enlist again under a different name.

In a country where 40% of men are unemployed, joining the ANA for 10 weeks is the best game in town. It relieves the poverty of many families every time the man of the family goes back to basic training, but it's a needlessly complicated way to unintentionally deliver such minimal humanitarian aid. Some of these circulating soldiers are aging former mujahidin -- the Islamist fundamentalists the U.S. once paid to fight the Soviets -- and many are undoubtedly Taliban. "

AGAIN after pouring so much money down a bottomless pit we should wise up to truly evaluate what the hell is going on over there

full link:
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175116/ann_jones_us_or_them_in_afghanistan_